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Abstract 
This thesis examines the temporary migration in the student's perspective. 
The endogenous growth model wi th heterogeneous agents and two period over-
lapping generations is used to analyze the pattern of migration and the growth of 
the countries. In this model, the technological efficiency and the education effi-
ciency are separated and there exists fixed cost and assimilation cost. Regarding 
the pattern of migration, it is determined by the comparison of education effi-
ciency in home country and foreign country and the comparison of comparative 
advantage in education or technology across the countries adjusted by various 
cost. I t is found that the pattern where only agents wi th less learning ability 
study and work abroad is possible since they would rather maximize their util-
ity through first period consumption where the high wage in foreign country is 
more attractive than the education efficiency. Regarding the growth analysis, the 
temporary migration wi th students studying abroad can lead to higher long-run 
output growth rate in the home country, but this can also lower the long-run out-
put growth rate owing to the cost of assimilation discounting the human capital 
before accumulation in the foreign country, or the growth rate can be certainly 
decreased if only those agents wi th less ability study and work abroad. The bi-
lateral migration is also possible to occur while the long-run output growth rate 
of the home and foreign countries are equalized, but there may not be mutual 
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1 Introduction 
In my thesis, I analyze the issue of temporary migrat ion and the human capital invest-
ment in student 's perspective, i.e. their migra t ion decision consists of the decision in 
work ing and studying. The model is the two-country endogenous growth model where 
the agents have heterogeneous learning abi l i ty. The similar form is once used by Haque 
and K i m (1995) to analyze the human capi tal and brain drain. Th is is useful to analyze 
the pat tern of migra t ion between the countries and the effect of the migrat ion on the 
growth of the economies. 
Temporary migra t ion has been one of the scenarios in the internat ional migrat ion. 
In the past, the Gastarbeiter system in the Nor thern Europe countries was common 
such that many Turk ish citizens migrated to Germany temporar i ly to fill in the short-
age of labor dur ing 1950s and 1960s. This in t u r n developed the economic miracle 
in Germany. I n U K , temporary migrat ion is also frequent that 40 percent of male 
immigrants and 55 percent of female immigrants do not stay in U K after five years^. 
Nowadays, the temporary migrat ion can take place in other forms. For example, uni-
versity students at tend the university in the foreign countries and work in the foreign 
companies in the role like par t - t ime jobs and internship programme. Some of the mas-
ter students (especially for the M B A students) and PhD students also uti l ize their 
t ime on study and work through research and consult ing service. On the other hand, 
the companies nowadays emphasize on the continuous t ra in ing for the young employ-
1 Refer to Dustmann and Weiss (2007). 
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ees called as trainee. There can be internat ional t ra in ing activi t ies to broaden then-
horizon. Th is type of temporary migra t ion can be categorized in two aspects. First ly, 
students or trainees study and work abroad according to the contract2. Therefore, the 
durat ion to stay in the foreign country is exogenous. Secondly, students or trainees 
usually have the plan before they study and work abroad. Therefore, i t is the voluntary 
and planned migrat ion^. 
I n the past l i teratures, many of them discuss the permanent migrat ion. Regarding 
the internat ional migrat ion, Galor (1986), Galor and Stark (1991), Galor (1992) and 
Kochhar (1992) adopt the two-country model w i t h overlapping generations to the dy-
namic general equi l ibr ium analysis of internat ional migrat ion. This does not involve 
the human capi tal accumulat ion and growth effect. Regarding the human capital ac-
cumulat ion, many of them involve the concept of bra in drain such tha t the temporary 
migrat ion is not considered. For example, Blomqvist (1986) discusses how the simple 
exogenous effect of skil led emigrat ion affects the consumption through the physical 
capital accumulat ion and human capital accumulation. Haque and K i m (1995), Wong 
and Y i p (1999) and Wong (1997) state tha t bra in drain is detr imental to the growth 
through endogenous growth model in the framework of Lucas (1988), while Mount-
ford (1997) and V ida l (1998) show that brain drain can produce positive effect for 
the source country. Other l i teratures involv ing migrat ion and human capital include 
^This is regarded as the contract migration belonging to the subcategory of temporary migration. 
Refer to Dustmann and Weiss (2007). 
3Refer to Wong (1995). 
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Shea and Woodf ie ld (1996) researching the immigra t ion of ski l led labor bundl ing w i th 
unski l led dependents such tha t the qual i ty of skil led labor immigra t ion is also the 
concern. 
Regarding the temporary migrat ion, D ja j ic and Mi lbourne (1988) studies the gen-
eral equ i l ib r ium model to derive migrant 's decision on whether to migrate and the 
length of the migrant 's stay in the foreign country. Karayalc in (1994) also considers 
the temporary migrat ion w i thou t immobi le factor under the framework of Galor (1986). 
Their researches do not involve the human capital accumulat ion and the growth anal-
ysis. W i t h the consideration of human capital accumulation, Wong (1997) considers 
the temporary migra t ion as one of the decision for the representative migrants so that 
temporary migra t ion benefits the growth of the economy. Domingues Dos Santos and 
Postel-Vinay (2003) considers the exogenous knowledge growth for foreign country and 
agents w i t h heterogeneous discount factors (also regarded as learning abi l i ty) to ex-
amine the pat tern of migrat ion and growth of the stock of knowledge. Domingues 
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2004) concerns the probabi l i ty of temporary visa or per-
manent visa issued to the immigrants in relat ion to the human capi tal accumulation, 
diffusion of knowledge and growth of the source country. The migrants therefore do not 
have the choice to choose the place they work and study. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) 
explains the reason of return migrat ion, i.e. a type of temporary migrants returning 
by their own choice, and analyzes the durat ion for the temporary migrat ion. 
The model in my thesis has the dist inct ive points where education efficiency and 
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technological efficiency are separately assessed"^ such tha t heterogeneous learning ab i l i ty 
has to match the technological efficiency, educat ion efficiency and various cost. In the 
decision of whether the students should s tudy abroad or not , th is involves the f ixed 
cost and also the cost of adapta t ion or assimilat ion. The qua l i ty of the education, 
i.e. educat ion efficiency is also the concern since they want to maximize their human 
capi ta l accumulat ion for the fu ture earning and consumpt ion. W h e n they t r y to seek 
jobs in the foreign countries, they w i l l also consider the wage rate in the foreign country. 
I insert these factors in the model to examine their effects on the decision mak ing of 
the agents. The heterogeneous learning ab i l i ty is set for the agents to examine the 
pa t te rn of m ig ra t ion w i t h respect to the heterogeneous learning abi l i ty. W i t h the 
above knowledge, the g rowth of the home economy and the foreign economy can also 
be analyzed. 
Section 2 is the l i terature review of the previous l i teratures about migrat ion. Section 
3 shows the setup of the model, the op t ima l decisions and the der ivat ion of steady state 
and balanced growth path. The analysis of the migra t ion pa t te rn and the economic 
g rowth are carried out in section 4，where the effect of the exogenous variables such 
as assimi lat ion cost, f ixed cost, education efficiency and technological efficiency w i l l be 
analyzed in section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion. 
4Wong (1997) and Wong and Yip (1999) have the number of skilled workers working in educated 
sector treated as the source of education efficiency, while they are sponsored by government income 
tax. The separated education efficiency and technological efficiency allow the relaxed formation of the 
educational resources in the economy. 
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2 Literature review 
Throughout the classical researches about the labor migrat ion, most ly they are con-
structed in the internat ional t rade framework. The variables such as the output , wage, 
and employment level on either the skil led sector or unski l led sector are discussed. 
Later the incorporat ion of macroeconomic components enables the researchers to ana-
lyze the impact of immigra t ion on the consumption, capital accumulat ion and economic 
growth. In the general l i teratures, the problems are main ly d iv ided into the four facets, 
which are source country or host country, permanent or temporary, skil led or unskil led, 
and legal or illegal. The last three are emphasized in Ethier (1986). According to his 
comments, some of the combinat ion can be ignored as some combinations are generally 
impossible. 
There are many l i teratures discussing about the internat ional labor migrat ion wi th-
out growth effect. Beginning in Galor (1986j. the approach of two-country model w i t h 
overlapping generations is applied to the internat ional labor migrat ion. He shows that 
all the homogeneous populat ions in impat ient country migrate to the patient coun-
t r y when bo th countries are under-invested relative to the golden rule. Regarding 
the welfare of the countries, the uni lateral migrat ion lowers the l i fet ime u t i l i t y of the 
populat ion in the host country, whi le this has no effect on the welfare of the country 
of emigrat ion. Bi lateral migrat ion takes place if one country is over-invested while 
another country is underinvested. Unl ike uni lateral case, bi lateral migrat ion leads to 
Pareto improvement for the welfare of the countries. 
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There are other works discussing about the internat ional labor migrat ion under 
the overlapping generations framework w i thou t growth effect. Galor and Stark (1991) 
concerns the differences in technological product iv i ty . When internat ional capital mo-
b i l i t y is not allowed, the migrants flow f rom the technologically-superior country to the 
technologically-inferior country i f and only i f over-investment occurs comparing w i t h 
the Golden-rule and long-run elastici ty of interest rate w i t h respect to the technological 
level is suff iciently large. Otherwise, the migrants flow f rom the technologically-inferior 
country. I f the capital mob i l i t y allows, the migrants must flow f rom the technologically-
inferior country to the technolgically-superior country. Kochhar (1992) includes labor 
supply in labor's decision dur ing the analysis of internat ional labor migrat ion. The 
effect of the labor migrat ion on the labor supply is relevant to the strength of the 
income effect and subst i tu t ion effect. I f the income effect dominates, the steady-state 
labor supply in the host country increases. Otherwise the steady-state labor supply 
decreases. 
Karayalcin (1994) has considered the temporary migrat ion in Galor (1986)’s frame-
work when there is no immobi le factor in the economy. The main result is that the 
temporary migrat ion is based on the wage rate only so tha t only uni lateral migraton 
takes place. Different to Galor (1986), the uni lateral flow does not involve all the 
populat ion in the source country since the temporary emigrants can return back to 
the home country to invest, thus increase the wage rate of the source country. The 
steady-state of temporary migrat ion is equivalent to the internat ional capital mobil i ty. 
In terms of the welfare, the welfare of the host country decreases while the welfare of 
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the source country increases when the economy is dynamic efficient. I t is also found 
tha t the temporary migrants save more than the non-migrants in the source country 
and the agents in the host country since the temporary migrants get the higher wage 
in the host country and invest at home in the higher interest rate. 
Regarding the involvement of human capital and bra in drain, Blomqvist (1986) 
adopts non-opt imiz ing dynamic model where two dynamics for human capital stock 
and the physical capital stock are present to explain the effect of exogenous shock 
f rom emigrat ion in the al locat ion of the saving in these two capitals. Two types of 
capi tal al locat ion f rom Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwat i and Hamada (1974) 
are focused. The al locat ion based on Grubel-Scott focuses on the exogenous al location 
on the physical and human capital, whi le the al location based on Bhagwat i -Hamada is 
demand driven such tha t the al locat ion depends on the other factors such as emigration, 
present amount of human and physical capital. The steady-state analysis shows that 
the results shown in the previous papers are valid, but this depends on whether the 
rate of re turn of human capital is larger than that of the physical capital. 
Haque and K i m (1995) adopts the two-country endogenous growth model w i t h 
overlapping generations and heterogeneous learning abi l i ty to examine the existence of 
bra in drain. The pat tern of migrat ion can be recognized w i t h respect to the learning 
abi l i ty level such that three patterns, i.e. all migrat ing abroad, those w i th strong 
learning abi l i ty migrat ing abroad and al l staying in the home country are observed. 
The cause is due to the sensit ivity of the human capital to the wage comparing w i th 
the fixed cost, assimilation cost and other fixed factors such that the agents w i th more 
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human capi ta l w i l l be lured by the foreign country. The growth of source country is 
proved to be reduced. The government can increase the g rowth rate of the economy 
by increasing the subsidy in educat ion when the economy is closed for emigrat ion. 
However, the complete educat ion subsidy for al l agents becomes detr imenta l to the 
g rowth since this accelerates the bra in drain. In view of this, the education subsidy 
should be granted to the agents w i t h less learning abi l i ty. 
Dif ferent to the result of Haque and K i m (2005)，Mountford (1997) adopts the 
overlapping-generations model w i t h small open economy to show tha t i f the education 
class is exogenous, al lowing uncerta inty of emigrat ion can increase the propor t ion of 
educated people in the source country and benefit the economy. I n the case w i t h 
endogenous education class, i.e. the human capi tal accumulat ion funct ion dependent 
of previous human capi ta l level and resource, when emigrat ion is not allowed, the 
inequali ty, due to mul t ip le equi l ibr ium, is larger than the case tha t there is chance to 
emigrate, thus i t is possible to increase the p roduc t i v i t y and the equal i ty i f there is 
chance to emigrate. On the occasion tha t brain dra in is allowed for the emigrants w i t h 
sufficient human capital, other agents in the economy also t r y to achieve the m in imum 
level of human capi tal in a b id to emigrate. This in t u r n eliminates the low human 
capi tal equi l ibr ium and improves the equality. I f the emigrat ion is only temporar i ly 
allowed, the human capi tal level can be improved also. One impl icat ion is that the 
immigra t ion quota is sensible to provide incentives for the people to carry out human 
capital accumulation. 
V ida l (1998) adopts the model w i t h small open economy and consumption carried 
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out in t l ie second period. I t shows that if the probabi l i ty to emigrate is large, the bra in 
dra in can produce posit ive effect for the source country since the people in the source 
country have incentive to accumulate the human capital. Furthermore, the dynamical 
system is fu l ly examined th rough the mul t ip le equi l ibr ium in human capital level, i f 
the probabi l i ty to emigrate is large enough, the human capital accumulat ion can be 
certainly l i f ted by leaving the or ig inal poverty t rap regardless of the in i t ia l level of the 
human capital. The probabi l i ty of emigrat ion is also endogenized by the human capital 
to enable the probabi l i ty to j u m p up when i t passes the threshold human capital level. 
Th is reveals tha t i f the human capi tal is lower than the threshold level, club convergence 
occurs in the short run whi le condit ional convergence occurs in the long run. 
I n view of the skil led and unskil led migrants, Borjas (1995) shows that the un-
skil led propor t ion of immigrants should be different f rom that of the natives in order 
to generate higher immigra t ion surplus. This can be explained by the nature of the 
constant re turn to scale product ion funct ion such tha t the wages of the skilled and 
the unski l led are unaffected when the proport ion of skil led to unskil led is the same for 
bo th the natives and the immigrants. On the other hand, i t is assumed that the skil led 
immigrants can be highly complementary across the other factors of production. The 
skil led immigrant can in general produce certain level of immigra t ion surplus. 
Shea and Woodfield (1996) researches the opt imal immigra t ion policy and the rel-
evant effect on economic variables such as skilled labor to unskil led labor rat io and 
wage rat io between the skil led and unskilled. They consider the importance of the 
quant i ty and qual i ty of the immigrants reflected f rom the fact that the skilled worker 
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can bundle w i t h the unski l led dependents. I f the government needs to consider the 
immigrat ion, i t needs to control the rate of immigra t ion by observing the number of 
unski l led dependents fol lowing the skil led workers. They show that government should 
always increase the number of immigrants if the number of unski l led dependents ac-
companying the skil led labor is small. When the rat io of unskil led dependents to the 
incoming skil led labor are sl ight ly larger than the unski l led to skil led rat io in the host 
country, i t is s t i l l acceptable to accept the skil led labor immigrants since the education 
cost can be reduced. When the number of unski l led dependents is too much, i t is no 
longer acceptable. 
Regarding the research in the temporary migrat ion, D ja j ic and Mi lbourne (1988) 
examines the decision of the identical agents w i t h f ini te work ing life. The decisions 
of the agents include the l i fet ime consumption and the length of period staying in 
the foreign country. Th is yields the opt imized u t i l i t y for temporary migrat ion and 
compared w i t h the u t i l i t y when the agents decide not to migrate. This further deduces 
the equi l ibr ium wage, amount of labors migrat ing to the foreign country, and the 
equi l ibr ium durat ion of the temporary migrat ion. I t is shown that reduction of cost of 
migrat ion increases the amount of temporary emigrants but reduces the durat ion. The 
increase in foreign wage increases the amount of temporary emigrants but the effect on 
the durat ion is ambiguous owing to the size of the elasticity of marginal u t i l i t y w i t h 
respect to consumption. 
Wong (1997) constructs the endogenous growth model w i t h representative workers, 
educators, government and capitalists. In his model, the size of educators sponsored 
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by the income tax contr ibutes to the education efficiency in the economy. The in-
ternat ional labor migra t ion such as permanent migrat ion, brain drain and temporary 
migra t ion are analyzed ind iv idua l ly and jo in t l y in endogenous decision w i t h the analy-
sis of balanced growth pa th and t ransi t ional dynamics. The growth rate of the source 
country decreases when the permanent migrat ion and bra in drain occur due to exter-
na l i ty of the education, whi le the growth rate increases when the temporary migrat ion 
takes place due to the human capital f rom the foreign country. 
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) constructs a model w i t h exogenous 
growth on the stock of knowledge in developed country, whi le the stock of knowledge 
does not grow in developing country dur ing autarky. The agents can be benefited by 
learning-by-doing external i ty so as to diffuse the knowledge back to home country i f 
temporary migrat ion takes place. The agents are heterogeneous in discount factor, 
or regarded as learning abi l i ty, thus the pat tern of migrat ion f rom the developing 
country to the developed country is determined. One scenario is that those w i t h low 
discount rate w i l l choose to migrate permanent ly and those w i t h relatively higher 
discount rate w i l l choose to migrate temporari ly, whi le those w i t h high discount rate 
w i l l stay in the home country. Regarding the dynamics, i t is shown that the long-
run technological gap between the developing and developed country is persistent, 
and when the technological gap is large, growth of the developing country increases. 
The wider long-run technological gap attracts more agents migrat ing to the developed 
country either permanently or temporar i ly to learn advanced knowledge. 
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2004) adopts the countries w i t h similar 
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properties stated in Domingi ies Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003). I t shows the 
u t i l i t y max imizat ion of the agents when they face the oppor tun i ty to work and carry 
out capital accumulat ion in the home (developing) and foreign (developed) country, 
thus this creates the cases for permanent migrat ion, temporary migrat ion or staying 
in the home country. However, whether to choose the types of migrat ion depends on 
the type of visa the agents get. Again the learning-by-doing external i ty exists when 
the agents work temporar i ly in the foreign country. The result shows that the growth 
of the source country dur ing the migrat ion depends on the mean education the agents 
take and the dif fusion of knowledge due to temporary migrat ion in developed country, 
thus the quota for the permanent visa and temporary visa can be set so as to maximize 
the growth. 
Dustmann and Weiss (2007) discusses the nature of temporary migrat ion and shows 
tha t the temporary migrat ion is significant in U K . A model is constructed in order to 
study the durat ion for return migrants staying in the foreign country before returning 
back to the home country. The durat ion depends on three aspects, including the 
marginal u t i l i t y of consumption in home country, purchasing power in the foreign 
country, and the human capital accumulation in the foreign country. The durat ion is 
the decision on marginal benefit and cost a t t r ibu ted to the above three factors. Larger 
marginal u t i l i t y of consumption in home country, larger purchasing power in home 
country and higher wage in home country due to more human capital accumulation 
can provide the incentives for the migrants to re turn back to the home country. The 
heterogeneity in skil l , where weight of certain ski l l is larger for home country and weight 
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of another ski l l is larger for the foreign country, is analyzed such tha t the migrants 
usually find the place which matches their ab i l i ty to have permanent migra t ion and 
temporary migrat ion. 
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3 The model 
Th is section shows the endogenous g rowth model w i t h heterogeneous agents. The 
mode l consists of two periods, where there are con t inuum of agents j G [〇，1]. The 
agents need to max imize thei r l i fe t ime consumpt ion in these two periods. There is 
no any credi t market for saving or bor row ing in th is economy. In order to carry out 
consumpt ion smooth ing, they need to invest in the human capi ta l in the first per iod. 
There are two countries, d and f . Coun t r y d is t reated as the home (source) count ry 
and count ry f is the foreign (host) country. They are the ident ical countr ies except 
t h a t the educat ion efficiency and the technological efficiency are dif ferent. I n th is 
model, w i t h o u t loss of generality, the analysis of count ry f is the same as the analysis 
of count ry d. I t is assumed tha t the countries do not have popu la t ion growth. The 
same number of heterogeneous agents is bo rn in each per iod. 
3.1 The maximization problem 
The agents in the home count ry maximize thei r u t i l i t y func t ion as fol low. 
f/"，"(Ctf = logQ^f+Z^logC^；! (1) 
where P is the discount parameter for the agents, and C f '^ and Cf'^^i are the consump-
t i on in per iod t for the agents j born in per iod t and t - f 1 respectively. 
There are the budget constraints for two periods. For the f irst period, 
Ct：； = [w^h^il 一 + 一 vf，])-姻] (2) 
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The agents receive the income to consume or study w i t h study effort equal to 約， 
hf is equal to the average level of skills f rom the parents' generation. Th is is the 
intergenerat ional external i ty such that the agents treat this as an exogenous variable. 
Th is ensures the presence of the posit ive growth rate. There are two options for the 
agents to choose. The first opt ion is tha t they want to stay in the home country to 
work and study thus receive the wage wf. The second opt ion is tha t they want to 
study and work abroad temporar i ly. I f they do so, they w i l l receive the wage in the 
foreign country w{, bu t due to the cost in adaptat ion and assimilation in the foreign 
country, their human capital has to be deducted by the factor x . I n addi t ion, since 
they study in the foreign country, they need to consider their f ixed cost Ft = 7/ i f which 
is assumed to be propor t ional to the average human capital^, i f ] and 妒，belonging 
to { 0 , 1 } , are labor supply for the agents in home country where they choose to study 
and work locally or abroad such that i f ^ + 妒 = 1 . 
Dur ing the study, the agents w i l l carry out the human capital accumulation. The 
human capital accumulat ion for the agent j is the linear funct ion of the study effort 
h f l , = [(1 + p 沪 ] 杯 + [(1 + P f S S t ] 捕 i ] (3) 
pd and pf are the education efficiency of the home country and foreign country re-
spectively. 3d。is the level of learning abi l i ty tha t the agent j can produce the human 
5The assumption of intergenerational externality and Ft 二 ^ hf are also adopted in Haque and Kim 
(1995) to ensure the existence of steady state and balanced growth path. 
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capital. has the fol lowing un i form d is t r ibut ion. 
(14) 
The mean is equal to m, and the lower bound and upper bound are m — | and m + 
I respectively w i t h the lower bound greater than 0, whi le the variance equals 
A l ternat ive expression of this d is t r ibu t ion is 
S'^^ = bj + (m - (5) 
where j〜U(0 ,1 ) . As the agents choose the same location to work and study, the labor 
supply is also treated as the indicator on where they study. 
In the second period, the agents have to stay in their home country. Therefore, the 
budget constraint is as follow. 
Q ' i ^ i = (6) 
The agents have to maximize their l i fet ime u t i l i t y by choosing Cf^ , C^^t+i^ ”f'〕, it,] 
and . T h a t is, they need to choose the l i fet ime consumption level, the study effort, 
and the locat ion they stay in the first period. 
The f irms have the constant re turn to scale product ion funct ion w i t h respect to 
effective labor force shown as follows. 
Yf = AiHt 
= A , l [ (1 - + h f ^d j + (1 - v {^nxh{d j ] 
.J Jd’t JO ./j" 
= A X / (1 - + Aah i + Aaxhi / , (1 - v{')dj (7) 
J Jd，t J Jf，t 
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18 the output of the country. Ht is the to ta l effective labor employed. A^ is the 
marginal product of effective labor. J^ t^ where i = d, f is the set of young agents 
deciding to study and work in their origin, wh i le，人wi th i = d, f is the set of young 
agents deciding not to study and work in their origin. This product ion funct ion includes 
the effective labor of the young agents working in the home country (from the home 
and foreign country) and the old agents. The prof i t of the firm at the home country is 
as follow. 
n f = AX I + (1 - v{')dj 
—wfhf [ i ( l - v t ^ ) d j 
J Jd，t 
The firms choose the opt imal level of effective labor as the price taker. Therefore they 
have the fol lowing first order condition. 
= (8) 
Proposition 1: Solving the above model, This yields the following results (Interior 
solution). 
” d,] d,] id,J I dj id, J (q) 
— id,j 丄 id,J /I n \ 。t,t - 十 Um’(2)广2 I^ IUJ 
_ /-id,J id,J I id,J /-] 1 \ 
U y + l — U(，亡+l，（l)il 十 < t^，t+l,(2”2 I 丄丄 
e . = / ( m a x { " ( 落 f / (始二 "(⑦ （12) 
where I is the indicator variable for i = 1, 2, i.e. the first option and the second option. 
The agents need to choose which location they should study and work by assessing the 
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ut i l i t y in each option. 
( 1 4 ) 
dj — P^d 1 /-. r\ 
where z^ = I -
yd^ J - l ^ L i (16) 
where Zf 二 
C 力，训—+ 如 ， ( 1 7 ) 
《 ； ⑴ + (19) 
^5+1,(2) = AdXh"去p、—,] + 1) (20) 
Proof: The proof is shown in the appendix A. • 
Proposition 2: To satisfy the interior solution, the following condit ion has to be 
satisfied. 
m a x { - ^ , (21) 
2 PzdPd PzfPf 
and Zd and Zf are greater than 0. 
Proof: The proof is shown in the appendix A. • 
Corollary 1: The part ial derivative of the u t i l i t y function for either staying in the 
home or studying and working in the foreign country is greater then 0 w i th respect to 
Qljlj 泥 QU 吐。 Qlja'] 
the learning abi l i ty (or j ) , i.e. > 0 and > 0，or > 0 and > 0. 
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Proof: The proof is shown in the appendix A . • 
3.2 Steady state and balanced growth path 
The fol lowing proposi t ion shows the steady state and balanced growth path of the 
variables. 
Proposition 3: The study effort is on the steady state after the dynamic starts. 
The human capi tal of the countries is on the balanced growth pa th after the dynamic 
starts bu t the growth rates are different for the home and foreign country. The con-
sumpt ion of the agents and the aggregate consumption are also on the balanced growth 
pa th after the dynamic starts and they have the same growth rate w i t h the human cap-
i ta l of the corresponding country. The output converges to the balanced growth path in 
the long-run. Regarding the balanced growth path for the output of the home country, 
i f no foreign agents migrate to the home country to study and work, the growth rate of 
long-run ou tput is exactly the same as the growth of the human capital such that this 
is immediately on the balanced growth pa th when the dynamic starts. In the si tuat ion 
that the foreign agents migrate to the home country to study and work, if the growth 
rate of human capital in the home country is faster than that of the foreign country, 
the long-run output for the home country grows at the same growth rate of the human 
capital in the home country, if the growth rate of human capital in the home country 
is less than tha t of the foreign country, the long-run output for the home country grows 
at the same rate of the human capital in the foreign country. I f bo th countries have 
19 
the equal g rowth rate on the human capital , then they have the long-run g rowth rate 
of ou tpu t equal to the weighted average of the human capi ta l g rowth rate for the home 
and foreign countries according to the in i t ia l effective labor force in the home country 
and foreign country. In general, the ou tpu t has the growth rate which is equal to the 
weighted average of the human capi ta l g rowth rate according to the effective labor 
force in the home country and the foreign country. 
Proof: F rom (15) and (16), i t can be di rect ly seen tha t the s tudy effort do not 
depend on t and i t is on the steady state when i t starts. 
F rom (3), the g rowth rate of human capi ta l in the home and foreign countries, hf.〜 
and /if+i，are 
hU = / "？(1 + P….你))由 + 厂 X"协+ 沪，乂吻. 
J Jd’t 
二 Ed^thf 
= [ / (1 + P / 於 为 . + 厂 X(1 + P d S f ' v l U m h ! 
= E j , h ( 
where 
Ed, t = / ( 1 + Pd沪)<，(\))办 + / , X ( 1 + ( 2 2 ) 
and 
Ef,t = / (1 + + / , X(1 + (23) 
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E ‘ t and Ef,t are the human accumulat ion factors for the home country and the foreign 
count ry respectively.々，and J " require the comparison of U苗 and U这, i . e . (13) 
and (14). hf {h{) is e l iminated dur ing the comparison, such tha t 力々 and ’ a r e 
independent of t. Together w i t h the s i tuat ion tha t u巧v^^)^ ^/'(i) and u法)are 
independent of t , th is implies tha t Ed,t and Ef,t do not depend on t and therefore Ed,t 
and Ef,t are replaced by Ed and E j respectively. Th is yields the s i tuat ion tha t hf and 
h{ are on the balanced growth pa th since the dynamic starts. The growth rate of the 
human capi ta l for home country and foreign country are E^ — l and E f _ 1 respectively. 
Since the consumpt ion for the agents, i.e. (17), (18)，(19) and (20) are l inearly 
related to hf w i t h other variables independent of t , the growth rate of consumption in 
f irst and second per iod are the same as the growth of the human capi tal of the home 
country and reach the balanced growth pa th immediately. The growth of aggregate 
consumpt ion is also the same as tha t of the human capital of the home country. 
Since Jd,t and Jj^t do not depend on t. Replace 々 t and Jf,t by Jd and Jj respectively. 
From (7), the growth of the ou tpu t for the home country is shown as follow. 
一 y计 1 1 
9d,t+l = 丄 
—^dH t+ i _ 
= 编 -
— h U l j ^ ^ - vf乂⑴)dj + 1] + xhU f y / l 一 ⑶)dj 
= ^ h f U j ^ ^ - v t l i ) ) d j + 1] + Xh{ / , ; ( ! — ⑶ ) d j 1 
— h f B d , t + h{Df,t 
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where 
B d , t = [ + l (24) 
•‘ Jd ‘ 
and 
Df,t = X [ T 入 講 (25) 
J J 
Bd,t is contr ibuted by the effective labor of young agents and old agents originated 
f rom the home country, whi le D i s contr ibuted by the effective labor force f rom the 
young foreign agents s tudying and work ing in the home country. Note tha t the study 
effort is steady such tha t Bd,t+i = Bd,t = Ba and Df^t+i = D u = D f . 
Therefore. 
J 
— E J i f B d + EfhjDf 
似计 1 = + — 1 
=Ed 产df 〜机,.-1 (26) 
h^B, + h{Df 'hiBa + h{Dj 
— F Bd I F Xf 巧 
— L d - f + 么/ -f 1 
Bd+'j^Df Ba + 
D (财吐D, 
= E , — — g ^ ^ + E / 、 E d b i t - 1 (27) 
Regarding the long-run output growth, f rom the expression in (27), 
/ 
E f - 1 if E f > E d and D f > 0 
Qd = lim gd,t+i = (28) 
t—oo 
Ed — 1 Otherwise 
\ 
Therefore, equation (28) shows that the growth of the output converges to the constant 
growth rate, imply ing that the output is on the balanced growth path in the long-run. 
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The magni tude of the long-run growth rate depends on which country has the faster 
growth rate of the human capital , or they have equal growth rate. • 
The expression in (26) shows tha t i f no foreign agents migrate to the home country 
to study, the ou tpu t growth solely depends on the growth of human capital in the 
home country. I f the foreign agents migrate to the home country, the output growth 
for the home country can be div ided into two parts, which are due to the accumulation 
of human capital f rom the home country and the foreign country. The extent of the 
type of human capital accumulat ion propel l ing the growth depends on the proport ion 
of effective labor force f rom the home country and the foreign country. The cause 
is due to the existence of foreign agents studying and work ing in the home country 
whose labor force also contributes to the f irms in the home country. The involvement 
of foreign labor force implies the involvement of foreign human capital, thus involves 
the foreign human capital accumulation. In the long-run, since the growth rate of the 
human capital on one of the country is relatively lower, the amount of human capital 
for two countries diverges and this leads to the diminishing weight on the effective 
labor force f rom the country w i t h lower growth of human capital, thus this converges 
to the faster human capital accumulation. 
The fol lowing corollaries show the properties for the growth of the output . 
Corollary 2: When there exists agents migrat ing f rom the foreign country to the 
home country, gd,t is increasing in t and converging to the balanced growth path. 
Proof: Suppose E^ > Ef, if t increases, the por t ion of effective labor force f rom 
the foreign country wi l l d iminish according to (26). Since Ed > E f , gd,t increases in 
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t. Suppose Ed < Ef, if t increases, the por t ion of effective labor force f rom the home 
country w i l l d imin ish according to (26). Since E^ < E f , gd,t increases in t. For the rest 
of the cases, the growth rate is already on the balanced growth pa th such that g山t is 
constant. • 
Th is implies tha t dur ing the external shock causing in-f low of foreign agents, the 
growth rate of ou tpu t may decrease temporar i ly and slowly recover to mainta in the 
long-run growth rate on various exogenous shocks. 
Corollary 3: When there exists agents migrat ing f rom the foreign country to the 
home country and f rom the home country to the foreign country, the long-run output 
growth rate of bo th countries become the same. 
Proof: This indicates tha t D / > 0 and on the perspective of the foreign country, 
Dd > 0, the growth rate is equal to max {£^广 1, E j — 1}. Therefore the long-run output 
growth rate of bo th countries becomes the same. • 
Th is implies tha t i f the bi lateral migrat ion takes place, the long-run output growth 
rate of two countries can be equalized. 
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4 The analysis of the migration patterns and growth 
This section analyzes the pat tern of the migrat ion and the economic growth when the 
agent needs to consider to study and work abroad or study and work at home. 
There can be four different patterns of temporary migrat ion. 
(a) All the young agents study and work in home country; 
(b) All the young agents study and work abroad; 
(c) Only those with stronger learning ability will study and work abroad; 
(d) Only those with less learning ability will study and work abroad. 
The pat tern is determined by the agents w i t h different learning abil i ty. Figure 1 
il lustates these four patterns. 
The learning abi l i ty level, (5〜*, where the home agent j * feel indifferent to study and 
work abroad or stay in the home country can be solved by equalizing the expression of 
the u t i l i t y U苗 and U运 through (13) and (14). Note that f rom corollary 1, the u t i l i t y 
has positive slope w i t h respect to the learning abi l i ty or j . This yields the fol lowing 
unique solution. This unique solution has to be between m — ^ and m + | for abi l i ty 
and between 0 and 1 for j . Otherwise, no agents feel indifferent to study and work 
abroad or in the home country. 




1 f — 1 m l 
^」——去） _ 
ZfPf - 严 ZdPd ^ 丄 
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where … ( 為 ) ( 乞 ) • 
The fol lowing proposit ion determines which pat tern of migrat ion should occur when 
comparing the education efficiency of the home country and the foreign country. 
Proposition 4: I f Zfpf>zdpdi i.e. the education efficiency in foreign country 
counting the effect f rom assimilation cost x and fixed cost 7 is larger than the education 
efficiency in home country, only the patterns that al l the agents study and work in the 
home country (pat tern (a)), al l the young agents study and work in the foreign country 
(pat tern (b)) and only those w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign 
country (pat tern (c)) w i l l be observed. Otherwise, only pat tern (a), pat tern (b) and 
the pat tern that only those w i t h less learning abi l i ty study and work abroad (pattern 
(d)) w i l l be observed. 
Proof: In order to exclude the pat tern (d), From the first order 
condit ion of (13) and (14) w i th respect to , 
麵 = P z c i P d S ' , ] - 1 ( ) 
'W^ - 5在八 ZdPd於]+ 1) ^ ) 
and 
己UU = PzfPfS',] - 1 
dSd,] Sd,J(ZfPfSd，J + 1) ^ ) 
Therefore, if and only if ZfPf>ZdPd and oppositely, i f we exclude pat tern 
djjd」 djjd」 
(c), i f and only if ZfPf<ZdPd- • 
When the education efficiency in the foreign country is sufficiently large, those 
agents w i th stronger learning abi l i ty have more incentive to migrate under the same 
condition. The above proposit ion also implies that if the education efficiency of the 
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home country is less than that of the foreign country. The pat tern that those w i th 
stronger learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign country (Pattern (c)) is impos-
sible to occur. 
The fol lowing proposit ion explains the pat tern of migrat ion when the foreign coun-
t r y has more comparative advantage in education after counting the effect of assimila-
t ion cost and t ime preference. 
Proposition 5: I f ^ > 二:〜 , i . e . the rat io of education efficiency to technological 
efficiency in foreign country is greater than or equal to the rat io of education efficiency 
to technological efficiency in the home country, adjusted by the assimilation factor x 
and t ime discount rate (5, i.e. the foreign country has more comparative advantage 
in education after counting the effect of assimilation factor x and t ime discount rate 
f3, only the patterns that all the young agents study and work in the home country 
(pattern (a)), al l the young agents study and work in the foreign country (pattern (b)) 
and only those w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign country 
(pattern (c)) are possible. 
Proof: We prove that i t is impossible that pattern (d) occurs if ^ > 二广 . S u p -
pose pat tern (d) can occur, i t can occur only if > - q ^ - From proposit ion 4, this 
implies ZfPf < ZdPd- We can see that 驚 >〈：… i m p l i e s ^ > 1. Therefore, regarding 
the r ight hand side of (29), the numerator is greater than 0 and the denominator, 
1 , 
ZfPf — ^ ^ Z d p d , is smaller than 0 due to ZfPj < z^Pd and ^ > 1. Therefore, S"^ '] is 
smaller than 0, imply ing that pattern (d) is impossible. • 
The following proposition explains the pattern of migrat ion when the foreign coun-
2 7 
t r y has suff iciently large comparat ive advantage in technology. 
Proposition 6: I f ^ < 二广,,i.e. the rat io of technological efficiency to ed-
ucat ion efficiency in foreign country, adjusted by the assimilation factor x and t ime 
discount rate (3, is greater than the rat io of technological efficiency to education ef-
ficiency in home country, i.e. the foreign country has sufficiently large comparative 
advantage in technology, only the patterns tha t al l the young agents study and work 
in the home country (pat tern (a)), all the young agents study and work in the foreign 
country (pat tern (b)) and only those w i t h less learning abi l i ty study and work in the 
foreign country (pat tern (d)) are possible. 
dijd'j dud‘’j 
Proof: Suppose pat tern (c) is possible, i t can occur only i f ^ ^ < - g ^ - From 
proposi t ion 4, We see tha t < if and only i f ZfPf > ZdPd and ^ < ^ ^^ ^ 
implies ^ < 1. Therefore, regarding the r ight hand side of (29), the numerator is less 
than 0 and the denominator, Zfpf — $两ZdPd, is larger than 0 due to ZfPf > z^Pd and 
(J < 1. Therefore, is smaller than 0, imp ly ing that pat tern (c) is impossible. • 
Table 1 i l lustrates the patterns of migrat ion under the description f rom proposit ion 
4, 5, and 6. 
In the fol lowing sections, w i thout loss of generality, I assume that the education 
efficiency of the foreign country is larger than tha t of the home country, i.e. p j > pd, 
and further analyze the patterns and economic growth under the case when education 
efficiency is proport ional to the technological efficiency and the case when the foreign 
country has large comparative advantage in technology. The case of bi lateral migrat ion 
w i l l also be discussed. 
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4.1 Case when education efficiency is proportional to the tech-
nological efficiency 
When the education efficiency is propor t ional to the technological efficiency, the com-
parat ive advantage in education are the same across the countries whi le there exists 
the involvement of assimilat ion cost and t ime discount rate, i.e. ^ = ^ > x二^广.. 
From table 1，it shows tha t the pat tern of migrat ion should belong to the boxes in 
upper-r ight hand corner and bot tom-r igh t hand corner such tha t only the patterns 
tha t al l the young agents study and work in the home country (pat tern (a)), al l the 
young agents study and work in the foreign country (pat tern (b)) and only those w i t h 
stronger learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign country (pat tern (c)) occur in 
the home country. 
In the perspective of the foreign country, the agents in the foreign country w i l l not 
study and work in the home country, since the education efficiency in the home country 
is less than tha t in the foreign country and the home country does not have sufficiently 
large comparative advantage in technology. Therefore, all the foreign agents w i l l stay 
in the foreign country (pattern (a) in the perspective of foreign country) . 
The agents w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty w i l l have higher tendency to study and 
work in the country w i t h higher education efficiency. This is due to the phenomenon 
that agent's learning abi l i ty can complement the high education efficiency to generate 
high return in human capital. Those w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty w i l l have stronger 
reaction on the human capital investment for the sake of the future consumption, thus 
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they are more responsive to the higher education efficiency in the foreign country and 
they are more responsive to the comparat ive advantage in the education than the 
comparat ive advantage in the technology. 
The first s imulat ion shown in figure 3，4 and 5 i l lustrates the s i tuat ion when the 
education efficiency is direct ly propor t ional to the technological efficiency^. In this 
s imulat ion, al l the agents in the home country migrate to the foreign country in the 
f irst per iod whi le al l the foreign agents study and work in their or ig in in the first period. 
The fol lowing proposi t ion shows the comparison of the human capital growth rate 
between the autarky, i.e. no migrat ion occurs, and the case tha t migrat ion takes place 
when education efficiency is propor t ional to the technological efficiency. 
Proposition 7: Regarding the s i tuat ion tha t education efficiency is proport ional 
to the technological efficiency, when al l agents study and work in the foreign country 
(pat tern (b))，the human capital growth rate of the home country may be increased 
or decreased depending on the cost of assimilation. When only the agents w i t h strong 
learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign country (pat tern (c)), the human capital 
growth rate of the home country may be increased or decreased depending on the cost 
of assimilation. 
Proof: From (22), the growth of human capital in the home country dur ing the 
®The simulations consist of variables run through the MATLAB procedure. Figure 2 provides the 
link between the variables in the thesis and variables under the MATLAB procedure. 
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autarky is 
E'；' - 1 . 
J 0 
Prnzdpd — 1 ,QQ、 
= 1 + /^  (33) 
the growth of human capital in the home country when all migrate to the foreign 
country in the first period is 
= rr^ 關 
The growth of human capital in the home country when only those agents w i th stronger 
learning abi l i ty migrate to the foreign country in the first period is 
E f - l 
= ( 1 + + J\{1 + P/沪，M，(~y办-1 
= { ( 1 - xW + i^dPd - X Z f P f ) [ ^ + P{m - l ) r ] } + (X — + xPmzfPf - 1 
— n ^ 
(35) 
The difference of the human capital growth between autarky and the case when mi-
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grat ion is allowed is shown as follows. 
=—P—dPd - XZfPf) - - X) 
TVp 
^ 0 
since ZdPd — X^fPf ^ 0 when ZfP j > Zdpd-
= [ P i z d P d — + m ) + P(1 - x ) ] { r — 1) 
— r r ^ 
^ 0 
since Zfpf — z^Pd > 0 when pat tern (c) takes place, thus ZdPd — X^fPf ^ 0- 口 
From this proposit ion, when the pat tern that those w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty 
study and work in the foreign country (pat tern (c)) occurs, the growth of human 
capital decreases or increases. This is a t t r ibu ted to two opposite effect. On the one 
hand, the agents w i t h strong learning abi l i ty spend much study effort to enrich their 
human capital through the high education efficiency in the foreign country. On the 
other hand, the cost of assimilation reduces the original human capital level for the 
future human capital accumulation in the foreign country. I f the cost of assimilation 
is too large, i.e. x becomes too small, the agents cannot mainta in fast human capital 
accumulat ion owing to the cost of assimilation as an in i t ia l filter. Nevertheless, min imal 
cost of assimilation does not affect the fast human capital accumulat ion much such that 
the growth of human capital can be increased in pat tern (c) under min imal fr ict ion. 
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The pat te rn tha t all migrate to the foreign country (Pat tern (b)) shows the extreme of 
pa t te rn (c) such tha t al l migrate to the foreign country dur ing the first period to learn 
the foreign education. Therefore, the growth rate of the human capital for pat tern (b) 
depends on its under ly ing pat tern (c). 
Th is result aligns w i t h the analysis of Wong (1997) such tha t the temporary mi-
grat ion is beneficial in terms of human capital accumulat ion in the foreign country 
when the assimilat ion cost is min imal . The result is also similar to the analysis in 
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) such tha t the agents w i t h stronger 
learning ab i l i ty tend to migrate to the foreign country. The qual i tat ive result is the 
same as tha t in Haque and K i m (1995) where brain dra in takes place in the last period 
of the generations, where the agents w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty want to earn much 
wage income through their high human capital level adopted in the home country. 
The fol lowing proposit ion describes the long-run growth of the output when the 
education efficiency is propor t ional to the technological efficiency. 
Proposition 8: When the education efficiency is propor t ional to the technological 
efficiency, the long-run growth rate of output in the home country is the same as the 
growth of human capital in the home country. Compar ing w i t h the autarky state, the 
long-run growth rate of output can be increased or decreased, depending on the foreign 
human capital accumulation and the assimilation cost as described in proposit ion 7. 
Proof: Since no foreign agents study and work in the home country, the long-run 
growth rate of output in the home country equals the growth of human capital in home 
country according to corollary 3. Therefore, the comparison of the long-run growth 
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rate of ou tpu t is the same as the comparison of the growth of human capital in the 
home country according to proposi t ion 7. • 
Figure 5 shows the dynamic of the growth in the first s imulat ion. The ou tpu t 
growth of the home country improves since al l the agents in the home country migrate 
to the foreign country to learn the more efficient education. Since there is no any 
in-f low of foreign agents to the home country, the ou tpu t immediately reaches the new 
and higher balanced growth pa th w i thou t t ransi t ion. The output growth for the foreign 
country temporar i ly slows down due to the inf low of the home agents. Since the growth 
of human capital in foreign country is higher in foreign country and all foreign agents 
stay in the origin, according to corollary 3, the output is st i l l on the original balanced 
growth path such tha t the growth rate in the foreign country w i l l be restored back 
to normal. This realizes tha t the in-f low of foreign agents can lead to the temporary 
shock on the growth rate of the output . 
4.2 Case when foreign country has sufficiently large compar-
ative advantage in technology 
From table 1, i t shows tha t when the foreign country has sufficiently large comparative 
advantage in technology^, the pat tern of migrat ion should belong to the boxes in upper-
left hand corner and bot tom- lef t hand corner, such that only the patterns that all agents 
in the home country study in the home country (pattern (a)), all agents in the home 
^Sufficiently large comparative advantage in technology is to satisfy the criteria stated in proposi-
tion 6. 
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count ry s tudy in the foreign count ry (pat te rn (b)) and only those w i t h less learning 
ab i l i t y s tudy in the foreign count ry (pat te rn (d)) occur i n the home country. 
I n the perspective of the foreign country, the foreign agents do not s tudy and work 
in the home country, since the educat ion efficiency in the home country is less than 
t ha t in the foreign count ry and the home count ry does not have suff iciently large 
comparat ive advantage in technology. Therefore, a l l the foreign agents w i l l stay in the 
foreign count ry (pat te rn (a) in the perspective of foreign country) . 
The agents w i t h less learning ab i l i t y concern more about the wage since their ab i l i t y 
complement the higher educat ion efficiency poor ly to produce high re turn in human 
capital . In view of this, they w i l l have higher tendency to s tudy and work in the 
count ry w i t h higher wage to earn a l iv ing and heavi ly consume in the f irst period. 
Th is is rather the oppor tun is t ic point of view to use wage to complement the skills and 
human capi ta l left by the older generation. Those w i t h less learning abi l i ty w i l l have 
stronger reaction on the at t ract ive wage due to higher technological efficiency of the 
country for the sake of current consumption. Thus, they w i l l be more responsive to the 
comparat ive advantage in technology than the comparat ive advantage in education. 
The second s imulat ion is shown in figure 6, 7 and 8，where the foreign education ef-
ficiency is higher than the education efficiency in home country, yet the foreign country 
has much more comparat ive advantage in the technology. The fixed cost is suff iciently 
h igh such that the agents w i t h stronger ab i l i ty find tha t i t is no longer beneficial to 
s tudy and work abroad. Th is results in the pat te rn where only agents w i t h less abi l i ty 
s tudy and work abroad. Th is k ind of s i tuat ion can be the possible phenomenon tha t 
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the wage level is much higher in the developed country comparing w i t h the developing 
country, whi le the education efficiency is only sl ight ly higher in the developed country 
comparing w i t h the developing country. In addi t ion, the fixed cost entering the devel-
oped country is moderately high. The simulat ion shows that the home agents w i t h less 
learning abi l i ty s tudy and work in the foreign country dur ing the first period. A l l the 
foreign agents stay in the home country dur ing the first period. The consumption level 
of those who study and work abroad is more in the first per iod comparing w i t h the 
s i tuat ion if they stayed in home country in first period, i.e. in autarky regime, while 
the consumption level is reduced when they come back comparing w i t h the si tuat ion 
if they stayed in home country in first period. 
The fol lowing proposi t ion shows the comparison of the human capital growth rate 
between the autarky, i.e. no migrat ion occurs, and the case when migrat ion takes place 
when the foreign country has sufficiently large comparative advantage in technology. 
Proposition 9: Regarding the si tuat ion tha t the foreign country has sufficiently 
large comparative advantage in technology, when all agents migrate to the foreign coun-
t r y dur ing the first period (pat tern (b)), the growth rate of human capital in the home 
country may be increased or decreased depending on the cost of assimilation if and 
only i f the education efficiency in foreign country counting the effect f rom assimilation 
cost X and fixed cost 7 is larger than the education efficiency in home country, i.e. 
Zfpf>Z(iPd] otherwise, the human capital growth rate of the home country decreases. 
When only the agents w i t h less learning abi l i ty migrate to the foreign country (pattern 
(d))，the human capital growth rate of the home country decreases. 
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Proof: From (22)，the g rowth of human capi ta l in the home country dur ing the 
au tarky is according to equat ion (33)，while the g rowth of human capi ta l in the home 
country when al l migrate to the foreign count ry in the first per iod is according to 
equat ion (34). 
The growth of the human capi ta l in the home count ry when only those agents w i t h 
less learning ab i l i t y migrate to the foreign count ry in the first per iod is 
E、f、- 1 
= J \ i + P d S d , ] 々 ⑴ ) d j + + P / 沪 办 - 1 
[(X - l ) / y + (xZfPf - ZdPd)库 + Pirn - + I3mz_ - 1 
= ^ (36) 
The difference of the human capi tal growth between autarky and the case when mi-
grat ion is allowed is shown as follows. 
匕d 一 ^d 
= - f ^ m j z d p d - XZfPf) — - X) 
— rr^ ( 
• 0 i f ZfPf > ZdPd 
< 
< 0 i f ZfPf < ZdPd 
since ZdPd — X^fPf ^ 0 when ZfPf > z^Pd (Refer to the box located at top- lef t hand 
corner in table 1), and X^fPf — ^dPd < 0 when z j p f < z^Pd (Refer to the box located 
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at bot tom-lef t hand corner in table 1), w i th x smaller than one. 
匕 d - ^d 
= ( X - l ) / y + {xZfPf - + P [ m -臺) j * ] 
— rr^ 
< 0 
since ZfPf — ZdPd < 0 when pat tern (d) takes place, thus x^ fP f — ^dPd < 0 w i t h x 
smaller than one. • 
From this proposit ion, this shows that when the pat tern that only those w i t h less 
learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign country (pattern (d)) occurs, i t is not 
beneficial to the human capital growth of the home country since if this pattern occurs, 
either the education efficiency of the foreign country is less or the cost of assimilation 
is too high to disturb the growth. Those w i th less learning abi l i ty choose to work more 
rather than study more, causing eventual slow down in human capital accumulation 
for the home country. 
Regarding the pat tern that all agents in the home country study and work in the 
foreign country (pattern (b)) appearing in the box located at top-left hand corner 
of table 1, when the comparative advantage in technology is sufficiently large and 
the education efficiency of foreign country is sufficiently large, all agents migrate to the 
foreign country so as to receive more advanced education in the foreign country and earn 
the higher wage through the higher technological efficiency in foreign country. Through 
this way, the growth of the human capital can be higher or lower depending on the 
assimilation cost. Regarding the pattern (b) appearing in the box located at bottom-
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r ight hand corner of table 1, when the education efficiency of foreign country is not 
large enough, the agents a im at earning the higher wage through the high technological 
efficiency in foreign country. I t is not beneficial to the human capital growth of the 
home country as described in the reasoning of pat tern (d). 
Th is result does not al ign w i t h the results described in Wong (1997) in terms of the 
human capital growth such tha t the growth decreases even if the education efficiency 
in the foreign country is higher. The pat tern of migrat ion is also opposite to tha t in 
Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003), since the agents aim at the high wage 
in the foreign country instead of learning advanced knowledge. This is detr imental to 
the human capital accumulation. The qual i tat ive result is also different to Haque and 
K i m (1995). 
The fol lowing proposi t ion describes the long-run growth of the ou tpu t when the 
foreign country has sufficiently large comparative advantage in technology. 
Proposition 10: When the foreign country has sufficiently large comparative ad-
vantage in technology, the long-run growth rate of ou tpu t in the home country is the 
same as the growth of human capital in the home country. Comparing w i t h the autarky 
state, the long-run growth rate of output can be increased or decreased, depending 
on the foreign human capital accumulation and the assimilation cost as described in 
proposit ion 9. 
Proof: Since no foreign agents study and work in the home country, the long-run 
growth rate of output in the home country equals the growth of human capital in home 
country according to corollary 3. Therefore, the comparison of the long-run growth 
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rate of ou tpu t is the same as the comparison of the growth of human capital in the 
home country according to proposi t ion 9. • 
Figure 8 shows tha t the growth dynamic of the second simulat ion. Similar to the 
first s imulat ion, the ou tpu t growth of the foreign country is reduced temporar i ly due 
to the shock by the in-f low of the agents f rom the home country. Since the growth 
rate of human capi tal is slower in home country and no foreign agents leave the origin, 
according to corol lary 3, the foreign ou tput level is restored back to its original bal-
anced growth path. Regarding the side of the home country, the ou tpu t reaches the 
lower balanced growth path where the growth rate reduces permanently. The agents 
who migrate to the foreign country dur ing the first per iod concern the technological 
efficiency so as to consume more and reduce human capital accumulat ion in the first 
period. Th is reveals the phenomenon different f rom the previous l i teratures. 
4.3 Case when bilateral migration occurs 
The fol lowing proposit ion shows the necessary condit ion for the occurrence of bi lateral 
migrat ion. 
Proposition 11: When the education efficiency in the home country is less than 
the education efficiency in the foreign country, the necessary condit ion for the occur-
rence of bi lateral migrat ion is that the home country has sufficiently large comparative 
advantage in technology. This implies tha t either all foreign agents study and work in 
the home country (pattern (b))，or only those w i t h less learning abi l i ty study in the 
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home country (pat tern (d)). 
I f the home country does not have suff iciently large comparative advantage in tech-
nology, under the s i tuat ion tha t the education efficiency in the home country is less 
than tha t in the foreign country, the foreign agents do not study and work in the home 
country dur ing the first per iod according to the box at bot tom-r ight hand corner of 
table 1 under the perspective of foreign agents. Therefore, i t is necessary tha t the home 
country has suff iciently large comparative advantage in technology to let the foreign 
agents study and work in the home country, where the pat tern is shown in the box 
at bot tom- lef t hand corner of table 1 under the perspective of the foreign agents, i.e. 
pat tern (a), pa t tern (b) and pat tern (d) occur in the foreign country. • 
Figure 9, 10 and 11 show the th i rd s imulat ion where bi lateral migrat ion takes 
place®. The foreign country has more comparative advantage in education such that 
this at t racts those home agents w i th stronger learning abi l i ty study and work in the 
foreign country, whi le the home country has sufficiently large comparative advantage 
in technology in the home country to at t ract those foreign agents w i t h less learning 
abi l i ty to migrate to the home country. 
From figure 11, i t is shown that same as the first simulation, the output growth 
rate of the home country can be improved through the migrat ion as the home agents 
can receive efficient education from the foreign country, but i t is different to the first 
simulat ion tha t the output growth rate of the foreign country is worsened permanently 
as there exists foreign agents who receive less efficient education f rom the home country 
^The model in Haque and Kim (1995) is not possible to allow bilateral migration to occur. 
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and consume more comparing w i t h the s i tuat ion when they stay in their or igin country. 
According to corol lary 3, the long-run growth rates of two countries are the same. 
However, th is s imulat ion shows that i t may not have mutua l improvement in terms of 
the long-run growth. 
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5 Effect of the exogenous factors 
The fo l lowing comparat ive statics assist fur ther in terpreta t ion on the effect on the 
mig ra t ion pa t te rn f rom the exogenous factors. 
Proposition 12: The learning ab i l i t y level where the agent is indi f ferent to s tudy 
and work abroad or s tudy at home count ry is influenced by the fixed cost, the assimi-
la t ion cost, the wage of home and foreign countries and the educat ion efficiency of the 
home and the foreign country. The comparat ive statics are shown in table 3. 
Proof: Di f ferent iate w i t h respect to the exogenous variables, i.e. 7 ， x ， P / ， 
Ad and pd- I f ^ > 二 : 广 and given tha t Z fP j - ^ ^ Z d P d 〉 0 , wh ich ensure tha t (5幻* 
can be w i t h i n the range between m — ^ and m + 臺， 
dS山r 二 (g击念〉0 
办 [ZfPf - 卢 Zd/Dd^ 
dS"^,]* - 1 ) [ ( 1 — Zf)pf + ^ ^ ' Z d P d ] . 
= 1 1 < U 
办 x{zfPf -i^'ZdPd) xizfpf -i^'ZdPd^ 
= 1 1 < u 
Af{P + l)(zfPf —《两 ZdPd) A 八 ZfPf —严 ZdPdY 
病 (祷 - i X ^ f P f — � n 
= J 1 ^ u 
dpf Pf{P + l){zfPf 一 <e阳之dPd) PfizfPf - i^'ZdPd? 
d ^ 二 ^ I ( g 击 - 1 乂 击 Pd ) 0 
c^d + l ) [ z j p f - — ZdPd) iP + l)MzfPf — i^'ZdPdy 
dS山]* (？ ^ - 、八 
— — = : x : 1 
却 d + l)(ZfPj -《而 ZdPd) {P + l){ZfPf — i^'ZdPdy 
I f 红 < 二 1 〜 a n d given tha t ZfPf — ^ ^ Z d p d < 0, which ensure tha t 沪，,can be 
Pd ^d 
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w i t h i n the range between m - | and m + 
d3d’r - : 0 
幻 (ZfPf -^^^ZdPdY 
(i沪，J* 击 - 1 ) [ ( 1 — Zf)pf + ^ ^ ' Z d P d ] . ^ = ^ ^ > • 
収 x O / P / - ZdPd) x{zfPf - c奸1 ZdPdY 
f 二 ^ —1)[(1 — + � 0 
d〜 Af(0 + l)(zfPf — ^ ^'ZdPd) A八ZfPf - i^'ZdPdf 
d5丄]* K击—m^fPf - 、n 
—^  = 3： ^ 
^Pf Pf{P^l){ZfPf -^^^ZdPd) PfiZfPf-^^+^ZdPdY 
dSd，r 二 逆 I (卢—ix^pd 
dAd AdiP + l){zfPf — ZdPd) (1 + P)Ad{zfPf - i^ZdPdV 
dS 山 J* 卢 (卢—击;5 
= ^ + ^ ^ 
却d f)dW + - i^'ZdPd) {P + V)(ZfPf - ^^ZdPd^ 
• 
Proposition 13: The study effort and consumption are influenced by the fixed 
cost, the assimilat ion cost, the wage of the home and foreign country and the education 
efficiency of the home and foreign country. The comparat ive statics are shown in table 
4. 
Proof: Differentiate the endogenous variables, i.e. <，("i), <’("2), ^ t w ) ‘ 
and Ct:;+、 ⑵ w i t h respect to the exogenous variables, i.e. 7, x,力/，Pf, ^ d and 
Pd-
For 
dvth) 二 _. < a ) = 二 _。 
d^ dx dAf dpf dAd 





= 匕 < 0 
dl x A f i l ^ P ) 
d/uf'i，、 3 
dx X ( l + " r ” 
dvf'L 3 
矛 勺 ) � o 
d v f L 1 ^ 
~ ^ = > 0 
dpf + 
肌t,⑶=腳t’(2) 二 Q 
dAd dpd 
⑴ 二 = ⑴=^^tMi) 二 Q 
d， dx dAf dpf 
dct;,⑴ 二 { p 》 ] + m \ 0 
dAd — + P 夢 ] 
⑴ 二 AM ( 0 
dpd 一 （ 1 + 射 种 
For Cf:l(2、, 
< U 2 ) _ hf 
drt — 1 + P 
< ^ ( 2 ) — { l - Z f ) h i A f jzfPjS'^^ + l)h^Af 
dx — 1 + /? + 
< ^ ( 2 ) 二（1 — Zf)h<}x jzfPfS'^^ + l)hfx 
dAf 1 + p + 
dCtl ⑶ — A f x M 
dpf 一 




f^rd,] d 广幻 rtrd，] rird，] 
〜，m，(i)=�’m,(i)=〜，m’(i)=〜抖i’(i) 二。 
dj dx dAf dpf 
= 赛 d 沪 ， + 1)〉0 
dAd 1 + 
dpd l+P 
F o r C丄 i，(2)， 
di — + 
dx 1 + /? 1 + /? 
dCt:“、⑶：A 议 htPpf,] 
dAf 1+/? Af ^ “ 
= AMxPzfS'^^ 





From the comparative statics on the agents w i t h indifferent choice, whether the 
agents have strong learning abi l i ty or not, i t can be shown that moves in the way 
to reduce the amount of agents studying and working in foreign country when the fixed 
cost and cost of assimilation increase (x decreases). When the technological efficiency, 
i.e. the wage, of the foreign country increases, more agents study and work in the 
foreign country. When the technological efficiency of the home country increases, less 
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agents study and work in the foreign country. Th is is the ordinary income effect which 
drives the migra t ion pattern. 
Regarding the comparat ive statics on the study effort and consumption, the increase 
of f ixed cost reduces the study effort, f irst per iod consumption and second period con-
sumpt ion in the foreign country. I t is due to the negative income effect imposing on the 
f irst per iod to reduce the first per iod consumption and increase the labor supply, which 
in t u r n reduces the study effort and reduces the future consumption. The increase of 
technological efficiency, i.e. wage, in the home country increases the consumption in 
the f irst per iod and the consumption in the second period whether the agents have 
studied in the foreign country or not. I t is due to the posit ive income effect on the 
l i fet ime. The agents staying in the home country face increase in wage through the 
l i fet ime, thus do not change their decision between labor supply and study. The agents 
s tudy ing and work ing in foreign country can also be benefited f rom this income effect 
after return. 
The reduct ion of assimilation cost ( x increases) and increase of foreign technolog-
ical efficiency increase the study effort, f irst period consumption and second period 
consumption of the agents. I t is due to the strong positive income effect and weak 
subst i tu t ion effect. The posit ive income effect f rom the increase of technological effi-
ciency and reduction of assimilation cost affect all periods in the l i fet ime to increase 
the consumption in the l i fet ime and reduce the labor supply, thus increase the study 
effort, whi le the negative subst i tut ion effect through these exogenous factors provides 
incentive to the agents to increase the labor supply, thus reduces the study effort. The 
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income effect can dominate the subst i tu t ion effect in the existence of f ixed cost. For 
the assimilat ion cost, since the income effect acts on two periods, the positive income 
effect is stronger and certainly dominates the negative subst i tu t ion effect. 
Regarding the effect of education efficiency on the migrat ion pattern, the study 
effort and the consumption, this involves the trade-off between the current consumption 
and the future consumption like the case in physical capital accumulation. Regardless 
of the country the agents want to stay, the increase of education efficiency provides 
strong negative subst i tu t ion effect and weak positive income effect to decrease the 
current consumption and increase the future consumption. Meanwhile, the decrease 
in current consumption is achieved by reduction of labor supply, i.e. increasing the 
study effort. Since the education efficiency induces opposite direct ion for the current 
consumption and the future consumption. The effect of education efficiency on the 
u t i l i t y funct ion is ambiguous. In turn , the effect on number of agents studying and 
work ing abroad is ambiguous. 
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6 Conclusion 
The thesis introduces the endogenous growth model w i t h two per iod overlapping gen-
erations to examine the phenomenon of temporary migra t ion in student's perspective. 
Fol lowing the methodology used by Haque and K i m (1995), I adjust the period of mi-
grat ion to allow the agents study and work abroad when they are young. In my model, 
the education efficiency and technological efficiency are int roduced separately while the 
agents face f ixed cost and assimilat ion cost and have heterogeneous learning abil i ty. 
The pat te rn of migrat ion is examined first whi le the growth of the human capital and 
ou tpu t is examined after the real ization of the migrat ion pat tern. 
Regarding the pat tern of migrat ion, the comparison of education efficiency between 
home country and foreign country, and the comparison of comparative advantage in 
education and technology across the countries adjusted by various cost are the main 
crux to determine the pat tern of migrat ion. Under the assumption tha t education effi-
ciency in the foreign country is higher than that in the home country, the conventional 
result is obtained through the s i tuat ion that the education efficiency is proport ional 
to the technological efficiency. Three kinds of pattern, i.e. tha t all stay in the home 
country dur ing the first period, all study and work in the foreign country dur ing the 
first period, and only those w i t h stronger learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign 
country dur ing the first period, are observed in the home country, while the agents in 
the foreign country stay in their or igin dur ing the first period. This is a t t r ibuted to the 
fact that agents w i th different learning abi l i ty choose to opt imize their u t i l i t y through 
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their backgrounds such tha t those w i t h strong learning abi l i ty can easily complement 
the h igh education efficiency. I f the migrat ion is allowed, the agents w i t h strong learn-
ing ab i l i ty tend to study and work abroad. This aligns w i t h the result in Wong (1997) 
and Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003). The migrat ion pat tern is also 
the same as tha t in Haque and K i m (1995). The growth rate depends on the opposite 
effect between stronger human capital accumulat ion and the assimilation cost. 
Two dist inct ive results can be observed. When the foreign country has sufficiently 
large comparative advantage in technology and under the moderately high fixed cost, 
the migrat ion pat tern, where only those young agents w i t h strong learning abi l i ty study 
and work in the foreign country, does not occur. On the other hand, the pat tern that 
only those w i t h less learning abi l i ty study and work in the foreign country occurs. 
Those w i t h less learning abi l i ty would rather t r y to complement the high technological 
efficiency, i.e., the wage. I f the migrat ion is allowed, the agents w i t h less learning abi l i ty 
tend to study and work abroad as foreign country has sufficiently large comparative 
advantage in technology. This is different to the discussion of the temporary migrat ion 
in the framework of Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003). This is also 
different to the brain dra in in the framework of Haque and K i m (1995). I f this case 
occurs, i t is possible tha t the growth rate decreases due to lower growth in human 
capital accumulation and the assimilation cost. 
Another observation is that when the home country has sufficiently large compar-
ative advantage in technology, the bi lateral migrat ion is possible to take place where 
the agents w i t h less learning abi l i ty flow from the foreign country to the home country. 
50 
I n the simulat ion, the home agents w i t h strong learning ab i l i ty study and work in the 
foreign country whi le the foreign agents w i t h less learning abi l i ty study and work in 
the home country. The growth of the home country increases because of higher human 
capi ta l accumulat ion, whi le the growth of the foreign country reduces since the foreign 
agents w i t h less learning ab i l i ty a im at earning higher wage in the home country bu t 
face lower rate of g rowth in human capital accumulation. The growth rates of two 
countries are equalized, bu t there is no mutua l benefit. 
I n summary, the pat tern of migrat ion can be more diversified and the effect on the 
decision and economy can be ambiguous in many aspects when the agents deciding 
to migrate temporar i ly are treated as the students s tudy ing abroad w i t h work. This 
arouses two pol icy impl icat ions. First ly, regarding the case when the foreign country 
has sufficiently large comparative advantage in technology, the local government can 
carry out assimilation program for the agents (especially for the agents w i t h stronger 
learning abi l i ty) in the home country. In turn, the education efficiency in the foreign 
country adjusted by the cost factors can be higher than tha t in the home country. 
Therefore, this prevents the pat tern that the agents w i t h less learning abi l i ty study 
and work abroad and decreases the growth rate of the home country. Secondly, gov-
ernments may be possible to have coordination in education policy and technological 
enhancement so as to keep the comparative advantage in education and technology to 
be closer. This can reduce the risk of the decreasing growth rate. 
5 1 
A Appendix: solving the endogenous growth model 
A. l Solving the endogenous growth model in general form 
Here shows a more general fo rm of the endogenous growth model w i t h heterogeneous 
agents and O L G for fur ther usage w i th in the thesis. The replaceable parameter is put 
in the constraints so as to suit the maximizat ion problems faced in this paper. The 
objective is to maximize the l i fet ime u t i l i t y funct ion below. 
= (37) 
k is the parameter indicat ing the or igin of the agent. The objective is subject to the 
fol lowing constraints. 
C t ^ X k , h i { I - ( 3 8 ) 
which is the budget constraint in first period w i t h replaceable parameter Xki and (pi. 
ki is indicator [d or / ) to see whether the agent w i l l study and work in the host or the 
foreign country in the first period. 
(39) 
which is the budget constraint in second period, k) is indicator {d or / ) to see if the 
agent w i l l stay in the host or the foreign country in the second period. 
= + (40) 
which is the human capital accumulation function. The dist r ibut ion of 沪“is U{m — 
| , m + I ) or S、J = bj + (m - | ) where ] 〜 U { 0 , 1 ) and m - f > 0. 
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To solve the model, we subst i tu te (38) and (39) in to (37) and mod i fy the problem. 
〒U。= — + + / 3 1 o g [ < i ( l + Pk 产]v^'hkM] (41) 
We assume tha t i t has the inter ior solut ion. The f irst order condi t ion is 
dU、] = -XkA'h^ 崎 仇 5、]XkM 二 0 (42) 
^ — XkiwthRl —於。+ ckh》 w^Ui^ + Pk,，]”i。、XkM 一 
Thus, 
XkA'i^ — Vt') + 01 “ w^UxkA^ + f>k,。必]、 
Solving (43)，we get 
” k j ^ \ (44) 
where 办i 二 乂…，. F rom (38), 
=(办1 - 作 ？ 納 ( 4 5 ) 
Combin ing the solved 必],we get 
From (39), 
c^Vi = +1) (句 
The u t i l i t y funct ion can be solved through the expression of C ^ f and C 5 + i f rom (46) 
and (47). 
U、3 二 log (顿 1 : : 1 ) � ( 4 8 ) 
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A.2 Decision of the agents in the model 
The agents in the source count ry need to determine the emigrat ion decision. Three 
opt ions are considered. (1) They stay in the source country permanent ly. (2) They 
s tudy and work in the foreign country and come back later. 
I f they stay in the source country permanent ly, the fo l lowing step is done. Replace 
01 by 0. Replace Xh by 1. Replace k, ki and k) by d. Th is yields equat ion (13)，(15), 
(17) and (19).9 
d,j = 1 
� 1 ) — r ^ 一 J T T p ) ^ 
where Zd = I -
化—ZdPd 沪。+ 1 
。从⑴—{TT^y^〜亡 
" � — log � 約和，+ 广奸1� 
I f they study and work abroad, the fo l lowing step is done, (pi is set to be equal to 
— 7 . Replace /c, k】by d and replace ki by f . Xki is replaced by x which is smaller than 
1. Th is yields equat ion (14)，（16)，(18) and (20). 
d,3 1 
亡，⑵—1 + /3 0 + 
where Zf = ^^^ 一厂. 
C^^J - 印 f 脾 ] + 1 h d f 
^The wages, wf and w{ for all t, are replaced by Ad and Af when firm's optimizing decision is 
taken into account. 
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C 5 7 + 1 ’ ⑵ ( 勺 p./.沪’ j + 1) 
“ _ + 阳 , 丄 , 
log Pf X 购 和 ’ + 例 〜 
A.3 Properties of the general form 
Refer to the general form, since we assume tha t i t has the interior s o l u t i o n ,必]h a s to 
be greater than 0 for al l j . 
1 _ _ > 0 




I n addi t ion, C '^^  and are greater than 0 due to interior solution. Therefore, 
f rom (45), Zk, > tJ^] > 0. 
We then consider par t ia l derivative of u t i l i t y (equation(48)) w i t h respect to 沪，〕. 
dU、] = _d_ (顿广 + 1)阳 
dSk。 — og ^ 
= ( ( 3 + l )zk,Pk, 1 
— 2 f c i P / c / � + 1 _ ^ 
二 - 1 
-5k，][ZkiPkJ>^,] + 1) 
� f 3 z k讽 八 m - I ) - 1 
-S'^^^izk.Pk.S'^^^ + 1) 
Due to ( 4 9 )， ^ ^ > 0 and immediately we can see tha t ^ ^ ^ > 0. 
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Therefore, by subst i tu t ing the parameters for the opt ion that the agents stay in the 
home country and the opt ion that the agents study and work in the foreign country, 
we get equation (21). 
b r 1 1 , 
m > m a x j — , — j 
2 pzdpd P z f P f 
and Zd and z j are greater than 0. Therefore, this proves proposit ion 2. 
Q T j d ' j d U ^ ' ^ d U ^ ' ^ d U ^ ' ^ 
I n addit ion, ^ > 0 and ^ > 0, thus > 0 and > 0. Therefore, this 
proves corol lary 1. 
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B Appendix: the steady state and balanced growth 
path 
The calculat ion of Ed, E f , Bd, and D f are shown as follows. Note tha t due to the 
four pat terns of migra t ion, each variable is d iv ided in the four cases corresponding to 
pa t te rn (a), (b), (c) and (d). 
For Ed, the four cases can be calculated th rough the general form, i.e. equat ion 
(22). I f pa t te rn (a) occurs in the home country, 
五 ” = J : [ … ⑴ ) d j 
PmZdPd + P ,〔。、 
= 1 + /5 (50) 
I f pa t te rn (b) occurs in the home country, 
二 r r ^ ( 5 1 ) 
I f pa t te rn (c) occurs in the home country, 
E f = (1 + + + 
= { ( 1 - x)Pr + - X Z f P f ) [ ^ + P{m - 1 ) ^ ] } + (X - l) /3 + xPmzfPf + P 
— TTp 
(52) 
I f pa t te rn (d) occurs in the home country, 
E、f、= J \ l + PdSd。々⑴、dj + + P/沪，乂由 
二 [(X - + ixZfPf - + P{m -鲁)j*)] + Prnz^Pd + P 
— i T p ： ^ ) 
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For E f , the four cases can be calculated through the general form, i.e. equation 
(23). Note that this expression is on the angle of the foreign agents, which can affect 
the growth of the home country. 
I f pat tern (a) occurs in the foreign country, 
4 … = + ：⑶] 
=pmr]fPf + 0 (54) 
— 1 + / ? �) 
I f pat tern (b) occurs in the foreign country, 
= ( X — 1)/? + xP^Wd + P (55) 
= rr^ �) 
I f pat tern (c) occurs in the foreign country, 
Ef = J f (1 + PfS.f,、{:(i、)dj + J \ { 1 + PdS叫:(2、)d] 
二 { ( 1 — x)Pr + ( " /P/ - + 队m - l ) r ] } + (X — 1)/^ + xPrnr^dPd + P 
— rr^ 
(56) 
S"^ '^ ** is the learning abi l i ty level where the foreign agent j * * feels indifferent to study 
and work abroad or stay in the foreign country. I f pattern (d) occurs in the foreign 
country, 
= j : , + P f 科 ⑴ 難 j : + 
= [ ( X - l ) P r + ixVdPd - V f P f ) { ^ + P{m - •)广)]+ f3miijpj + P _ 、) 
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For Bd, the four cases can be calculated through the general form, i.e. equation 
(24). I f pat tern (a) occurs in the home country, 
Br = f : (1 - vf:,”)dj+1 
I f pa t tern (b) occurs in the home country, 
B ' d ' � = / 0 ( 1 - <，(\))而.+ 1 
«/ U 
二 1 (59) 
If pat tern (c) occurs in the home country, 
对 ） = ’ 〔 a - v f 講 + 1 
二 (1 - 与 r + ( y , + — + 1 (60) 
I f pat tern (d) occurs in the home country, 
Bf 二 / 1 ( 1 - <， ( \ )M 7 + 1 
For Df, the four cases can be calculated through the general form, i.e. equation 
(25). Note tha t this expression is on the angle of the foreign agents, which can affect 
the growth of the home country. 
I f pat tern (a) occurs in the foreign country, 
Df = 
= 0 (62) 
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I f pa t te rn (b) occurs in the foreign country, 
= [ ( 1 — + _ _ i _ _ l n ( ^ ) ] (63 ) 
I f pa t te rn (c) occurs in the toreign country, 
Df = 而 
J j 
- ( 6 4 ) 
I f pa t te rn (d) occurs in the foreign country, 
Df = x / o 广 ( 1 - 而 
= X { ( 1 - + ( \ In[幻•** + ( " ; • ) ) ] } (65 ) 
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Pntiem (a) Pattern (h) 
V^ { M i 
. 一 為 丨 . —1〜）： • 
"o] 7 [ r - ^ 7 [ r ^ 
Paneiit (c) Pattern ( i f ) 
Figure 1: Four migra t ion pat terns 
^ < X^^'Af Pf〉X糾Pd 
Pd Pf Af — Ad 
Foreign country has sufficiently 
large comparative advantage in technology 
Zfpf>Zdpd, i.e. > Pd (b) (a), (b)，(c) 
ZfPf < Zdpd, i-e. < Pd (a), (b), (d) (a) 
Table 1: Pat tern of m ig ra t ion 
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First s imulat ion Second simulat ion T h i r d s imulat ion 
(3 0.95 0.95 0.95 
m 4 4 4 
b 2 2 2 
hf 300 300 100 
h( 200 200 500 
Ad 10 10 13 
A f 12 13 10 
Pd 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Pf 0.6 0.6 1 
7 0.5 2.85 0 
X 0.95 1 1 
Table 2: The in i t ia l parameters for the first, second and t h i r d simulations 
1 X ^f Pf ^d Pd 
沪， i f g 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ given that z j p j - ZdPd > 0 + - - ？ + ？ 
沪J* if ^ < ^ ^ ^ given that ZfPf - ^^^ z^Pd < 0 - + + ? - ？ 
Table 3: Comparative statics for proposit ion 12 
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The simulations are done tliro\igh the Matlab. This table show-, the Imk benveen the MATLAB 
vanabies shown m the smiuktion figures and the variables in the thesis. 
Ud: U丄J vd: vf-' 
i 
udd: U^/ vdd: v f j , 
Udf:【;；!:/ 碰 、 力 i 
uff： u；：-' vff： 
K * > 梟• V • 
U f d : � / < • / vfd: v f : i , 
- ’ ^ ‘ V, - / 
Cell: C / cf i： c ! / 
* . r I .； 
• c : % � c f f l : 〔 品 
cdfi： cm： 
Cd2: C V , Cf2: C : :\ 
> • V * fc • • Z — 
dd^, C- - - / T Oft-fci. C- “ . 1 /I、 
d d f ' T < d fd^, - 1 , 
».r—‘八- r. ‘ —i.i - .1 
jd: agent / in the home coiintrv g d :容 " , 
!f: asent / i i i the foreign country sf: P . 
J w i/ w •一 O > t 
deltad-
deitaf: 0 ' ' 
F igure 2: Variables in the s imulat ions 
1 X Af Pf ^d Pd 
< f i ) 0 0 0 _ _ 0 _ _ ^ 丄 
<(2) - + + + 0 _ _ ^ 
Q Q 0 0 + -
坊 ⑵ - + + - 0 0 
^5+1,(1) _ ^ 丄 ^ _ _ 0 + + 
c t U m II - I + M + M • 
Table 4: Comparat ive statics for proposi t ion 13 
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Ud against jd vd against deltad 
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15 9 Udf vdf 
• z - 一 0.3 一 一 ： 
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jd deltad 
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2800 , T — — — ] 5500 i, . 
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2 6 0 0 、 \ \ Cdf1 5000 | Cdf2 , / 
- 、 \ cNj 
5 2400 、 、 3 4500 ^ 
2200 4000 ^ ^ ^ ^ 
2000 ‘ ‘ • 35001- ‘ • ‘ 
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
deltad deltad 
Figure 3: The home count ry i n f irst s imulat ion 
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Uf against jf vf against deltaf 
16| 0.5 I ‘ r = = = — 1 
Uff vff 
Ufd 0 4 vfd 
15.5 
3 一 > 0.3 z z 一 一 ^ ^ 
15 一 一 一 — 一 - - - - 一 
—————— 0 . 2 Z 一 一 一 
z 
z 
I4.5I • 0.1 L ‘ 
0 0.5 1 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
jf deltaf 
Cf1 against delta Cf2 against delta 
2000 n 5000 
一 ⑶ ^ 
1800 cfcn ^ ^ ^ ^ 
4000. ^ ^ , 
g 1 6 0 0 、 \ 5 ^ ^ z z , , 一 
、 - 、 3000 Z z ： 
1400 、 、 、 、 〜 、 cff2 
、 Cfd2 
12001 2000 ' 
3 3.5 4 4.5 5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
deltaf deltaf 
F igure 4: The foreign count ry in f irst s imulat ion 
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gd before migration 
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TO 
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^ 0.54 - _ 
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0.5 - _ 
0.48 - “ 
_ ..." » —I t 
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Figure 5: The growth analysis in first s imulat ion 
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Ud against jd vd against deltad 
15.81 ] 0.41 —r— 
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15.75 ^ ^ ^ 0.3 vd f | ^ ^ ^ 
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Figure 6: The home count ry in second s imulat ion 
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Uf against jf vf against deltaf 
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F igure 7: The foreign count ry in second s imulat ion 
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— t gf 
0.7 - - gd before migration 
gf before migration 
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0.55 - -
0.5 - _ 
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Figure 8: The growth analysis in second s imula t ion 
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Ud against jd vd against deltad 
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Figure 9: The home count ry in t h i r d s imulat ion 
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Uf against jf vf against deltaf 
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Figure 10: The foreign count ry in t h i r d s imulat ion 
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Figure 11: The g rowth analysis in t h i r d s imulat ion 
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